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ABSTRACT
The Very Low Frequency Propagation Mapper, an Air Force Research Laboratory 6U CubeSat, is currently in
operations complementing the Demonstration and Science Experiments (DSX) satellite by taking coincident
measurements with DSX of the inner magnetosphere. This presents an exciting way to have a low-cost platform
enhance an existing mission’s data set with multiple spatial collection points. The Small Satellite Portfolio (SSP) had
overall responsibility for the vehicle, ground system, and mission design; by enabling the team to make technical and
programmatic decisions on their own, the team has been able to overcome many hurdles in short timeframes. Further,
the team was constructed with a diverse set of skills to handle the many complexities of space systems. Finally, the
team, and SSP as a whole, recognize that changes to the system and mission are not only expected but desired as
mission maturity is gained. This paper outlines a selected set of issues and challenges that occurred, the ways the team
dynamically handled the situations, and lessons learned for systems that are constrained in both cost and capability
(e.g. small satellites).
architectural element
implementation.

INTRODUCTION
The Very Low Frequency (VLF) Propagation Mapper
(VPM) satellite, an Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL) 6U CubeSat, is designed to augment the
Demonstration and Science Experiments (DSX)
satellite's VLF transmission experiment being flown by
AFRL. Small satellites, especially Cube Satellites
(CubeSats), present an opportunity to enable
simultaneous observations of the same phenomena in
fairly low-cost, short timeframes. The ability to augment
a much larger mission’s data set temporally or spatially
is essentially unprecedented within the Air Force and an
incredible use-case for these platforms. VPM not only
enhances the DSX mission, it experiments with the
concept of using small satellite platforms as a key
1
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AFRL’s Small Satellite Portfolio (SSP) has been
designing, integrating, and operating spacecraft that
have explored the utility of small satellites in Air Force
applications for about eight years. With each iteration of
spacecraft, SSP has been able to raise the baseline
capabilities demonstrated on the CubeSat platform by
implementing lessons learn from previous spacecraft –
VPM largely pulled lessons learned from the GEARRS
1, GEARRS 2, and SHARC missions. The GEARRS
satellites demonstrated that global telemetry monitoring
was possible using a Globalstar transmitter designed for
terrestrial use [3, 4]. VPM was able to implement this
technology to continuously beacon vehicle state of
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health telemetry that provides operators with valuable
insight into the spacecraft globally (and more often than
line of sight passes). The SHARC spacecraft had many
similarities to VPM and was pivotal in forming SSP
spacecraft design philosophies. VPM was able to
implement lessons learned from SHARC to improve
vehicle telemetry collection, fault handling and
automation of uplinking/downlinking to the vehicle. By
leveraging these lessons, SSP was not only able to build
a spacecraft to support the VPM science mission, but was
also able to explore design, execution, and philosophical
approaches for flight and ground systems.

subsystems. By carefully envisioning each decision’s
impact on the highest-level mission objectives, rapid
convergence on a solution was possible without
significant programmatic burden [5, 6]. VPM was one of
the use-cases that led to the development of the agileinspired system engineering and mission assurance
approach currently being formalized in SSP [7]. The
team was enabled to try various execution paths in the
system design and also to plan for operations; once in
operations rapid response to issues and small, iterative,
improvements to capabilities was not only expected, but
implemented, given that the system design and the “rules
for engagement” in operations allowed for open ended
experimentation on orbit.

The primary, and unique, schedule driver for the VPM
mission was to be operational simultaneously with the
DSX spacecraft. Due to the nature of the science
mission, VPM was required to launch within six months
of the STP-2 Falcon Heavy on a separate launch vehicle.
This drove a rapid and reactive development schedule
with numerous external variables. Despite the
challenges, VPM launched to the International Space
Station on 5 December 2019 and began operations upon
deployment on 1 February 2020. Operations are
expected to last for at least six months in tandem with
DSX with goal objectives lasting 12 months (limited
currently by frequency license).

The remainder of the paper will discuss in some greater
detail the above approaches, the issues experienced and
how they were handled, and outline the process from
design through operations.
VPM DESIGN AND INTEGRATION
SSP missions generally start out with a set of high-level
mission objective(s) from which minimal and full
mission success criteria are derived. The system design
which satisfies these criteria is an open trade space that
entails, among other things, how the mission team should
put the bus or space asset together. Rather than a rigid
set of requirements, the success criteria are an ongoing
conversation with the mission stakeholders as the system
evolves and grows in maturity. Procurement options
include the full spectrum of buy-or-build that seeks to
leverage the commercial satellite hardware and software
market whenever possible. Due to the rapidly evolving
nature of the market and new entrants to capability
offerings, many components were assessed and adapted
to meet the desired performance. This evolution was
expected based on portfolio experience with SHARC
and other CubeSat missions. A critical choice in system
level design was to emphasize modular design
(encapsulated functionalities, not plug-and-play) in both
hardware and software to permit the lowest possible
impact when a system required modification or
replacement. By maintaining a team of engineers with
hardware and software design skills, the team could
rapidly prototype and integrate custom solutions to
overcome gaps or interface mismatches in the
commercial hardware. All critical electrical interfaces
were handled with a mission-specific interface card
designed and populated in-house. This design and the
associated engineering skill sets allowed new board
designs to be prototyped, spun and tested within days or
weeks rather than the usual procurement timelines of
multiple months. Leveraging the team’s ability to buy or
build solutions and evolve the mission success criteria to
match, the mission altered and improved hardware and

Small Satellite Portfolio Mission Design
The VPM mission was initially conceptualized in 2012
and has gone through several iterations of the mission
design cycle before finally reaching full authority to
proceed in January 2018. Once the DSX launch became
solidified, so did the need and timeline for VPM. Even
though VPM is relatively “low-cost, short timeframe” it
is still a complex system requiring significant resources.
The mission was kicked off with an initial acquisition
strategy planning the use of commercial CubeSat
hardware to support an in-house AFRL developed
payload. This hybrid approach allowed SSP to internally
have the objective to assess the capabilities available in
the CubeSat market while the SSP engineering team
could react to changes in schedule and launch vehicle
using creative engineering solutions.
From the outset, the team had a defined scope and
prioritized improvements to capabilities (building off of
the previous missions); this allowed the team to operate
and make decisions fairly independently within the welldefined bounding-box. Organizational risk posture was
defined early and was decided to be fairly accepting.
Trust was placed in the mission team to iteratively
prototype solutions to a multitude of problems without
inducing much process on the iteration/decision making.
The engineers were encouraged to design and test the
system with modularity and flexibility in-mind such that
procurement risks could be taken on various “black-box”
Willett Gies
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provided simple integration with AI&T ground software
tools allowing the team to “test as you fly” through a
COSMOS 2[9] interface from Day 1. It was also a
tremendous asset to have the source code accessible to
the team, and due to the fact that SDL utilizes Radiant on
multiple missions, the code base also had developers
from other missions outside SSP contributing.

software interfaces and functionality well into the testing
phase.
The VPM team went into development planning to have
some hardware modification, and saw the flight software
as the key interfacing element to enabling this process.
This meant one of the first design decision points in the
mission development process, before any hardware was
delivered, was how to address the flight software
implementation. The VPM team opted to take a modular
and configurable approach for the flight software
architecture that could flex with both hardware and
software design/testing outcomes to still achieve
success. When presented with challenges in the
commercially supplied small satellite design-space, it is
highly valuable to have the team and programmatic
mentality to accept what cannot be changed, and change
what can.

The flight software rapid development strategy included
several other attributes that yield dividends across
multiple SSP missions:

Modular Design
Having loosely established mission success criteria, the
team rapidly identified a Minimum Viable Product
(MVP) or set of capability that the flight software,
hardware, and ground system needed to provide. Small
(~5 person) teams were then stood up and co-located as
close together as feasible to encourage cross-pollination
[7]. Rather than a full requirements derivation, the MVP
approach allowed the hardware, software and ground
teams to take their minimum functionality and
decompose internally to the level they required. This
MVP incorporated lessons learned from previous
missions: fault handling, parallel development, engineerled operations, etc. While greater than the absolute bareminimum set of functionalities, it was determined to be
the absolute lowest bar of capability to be worth
delivering to orbit.

1.

Leverage agile software approaches.

2.

Utilize a development framework for
integrating hardware and payloads via serial,
Ethernet, Spacewire, USB, and I2C.

3.

Streamline process of supporting new/existing
spacecraft hardware buses.

4.

Grow "library" of examples and hardware
support.

5.

Leverage automatic code generation for
command and telemetry messaging and
COSMOS integration.

Flight Software Design
Radiant is based on SSM [9-13], which is a modular
reusable
open-network
software
development
framework. SSM was the middleware layer for the flight
software used on SHARC and had been an enabling
technology for that mission. Radiant encompasses a set
of core flight software services that ride on top of SSM
as the Core Flight Software (FSW) layer shown in Figure
1, the inter-process communication fabric in this case is
network based.

To marry with the hybrid hardware solution, the teams
selected the Radiant flight software. Radiant, at its core,
is a modular reusable open-network software
development framework targeted at space systems and
space systems development. This is SSP's first time
using Radiant for a mission, and the first time a Radiantbased space system is delivered to orbit. Significant
consideration was put into the flight software trade, but
it was done early and decisively by the team and SSP
leadership. This proved to be an enabling decision
throughout the development and testing process. It
should be noted that Radiant core capability exceeded
MVP in many cases, but required developing hardwarespecific applications for all the hardware components,
with some reuse from SHARC (e.g. GPS App). Radiant's
modularity and network interfacing of the flight software
2
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the board's associated software module, the rest of the
transition took place within two weeks. The FSW team
absorbed a great deal of the failed board’s functionality
through additional configuration, e.g. startup and
telemetry processing. However, no additional changes to
the overall flight software were needed because of low
coupling, good modularity, and good encapsulation.
Further, the broad skillset hardware team easily handled
the design and fabrication of an interface board.
OPERATIONS
Much like AI&T, the SSP team expected to encounter
anomalies and prepared to resolve or mitigate them (for
instance, the operations team was not trained to specific
procedures but focused on key activities so that desired
outcomes were known and the team could adapt and
problem solve to achieve success). Anomalies on orbit
require more creative solutions than the AI&T floor but
the same understanding and careful troubleshooting as
hands-on debugging. For VPM, this opportunity
presented itself immediately after deployment. This
section will discuss some of the anomalies seen on VPM
during early operations and how the team responded to
overcome the anomalies.

Figure 1: Flight software layers.
This middleware layer allows all the core and missionspecific Apps and services to talk to each other without
being tightly coupled. Modularity enables reuse, and
good abstraction and encapsulation enable modularity
[1, 2]. The Middleware and Core FSW layers can be
reused almost wholly across missions with bug fixes and
new features being added. The Component Apps can be
reused when using the same hardware allowing for a
library of hardware to be built up. This allows developers
the ability to leverage as much existing capability as
possible going into each mission, to rapidly prototype,
and to see what doesn't work.

Deployment and designing for a tumble
VPM’s initial deployment CONOPS was to
automatically deploy the solar panels, detumble, and go
into a 3-axis stabilized sun pointing mode without
operator intervention. This level of automation is not
uncommon, but it is a higher risk acceptance stance than
many missions take. The decision to allow the vehicle to
achieve this high level of functionality was based on the
premise that should issues arise, VPM has implemented
SSP’s design principles for surviving an uncontrolled
attitude state:

With a core in place and a modular approach for
interfacing with each hardware system the flight
software became the enabling technology for meeting
hardware milestones and providing support for
integration testing as needed. This helps the entire
system be resilient to change and promote reuse of the
support Apps if hardware is reused on other missions.

1.

Spacecraft power systems shall be capable of
generating power to operate in a safe mode
while attitude is uncontrolled.

2.

Telemetry shall be received by the operator in a
tumble without fine knowledge of spacecraft
position.

3.

Radio uplinks shall be able to close in a tumble
[6].

Modularity and the GPS Subsystem
The modular architecture, with well-defined interfaces
for connecting components, allows for parallel
development efforts and decouples changes or failures in
hardware from dependent or interrelated components
from affecting one another. This resiliency to change is
illustrated by GPS subsystem modifications made during
VPM's development cycle. The first generation of
commercial GPS interface board requires an I2C
interface for local control and a UART direct to the GPS
receiver. This adapter board suffered a latent electrical
failure during test. The VPM team opted to simply
remove the carrier board and develop a bare-minimum
interface board that did not require a management
software interface. While software development time
was lost with the removal of the I2C carrier board and
Willett Gies

Thus a higher functionality, higher risk operation,
resides on the backbone of a resilient design feature.
In order to implement the first design principle, VPM
implemented a set of spacecraft modes below the
nominal operations modes: sun safe, survival, and
phoenix modes. With each demotion of mode, both
power consumption and spacecraft capability were
reduced. The second design principle was accomplished
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using a Globalstar transmit-only modem to beacon out
spacecraft state of health telemetry. The third design
principle was implemented using patch antennas with a
simple antenna switching algorithm to achieve a nearomnidirectional antenna beam pattern.

Figure 2: The VPM spacecraft with solar panels and
antennas deployed.
This led to implementing automatic mode transitions
based on battery voltage. The default mode following the
hazardous operations period was sun safe mode; this
mode had all of the VPM bus subsystems powered. In
the case of a low battery, the system would fault into
survival mode; this mode would power off the ADCS
and GPSR subsystems to conserve power, but retain the
ability to command the spacecraft and transmit beacons
to Globalstar. In the case that the spacecraft was still not
power positive, the system would fault into its phoenix
mode; this mode is a charge only mode where the EPS
subsystem cuts power to the reset of the system until high
enough battery voltage threshold has been achieved (e.g.
a state of charge hysteresis allowing for some time for
the vehicle to attempt to recover, achieve ground contact,
etc.).

VPM utilized all three implementations of designing for
a tumble immediately following kickoff. On the first day
of operations, using the Globalstar beacon, the team was
able to determine that when VPM was deployed, it
successfully executed the hazardous operations timer
and deployed the solar panels. However, the spacecraft
was not de-tumbling and was power negative. VPM
quickly transitioned to survival mode, but the spacecraft
was still not power positive in the tumble with even the
bare minimum of functional avionics and software
running. For the next 10 days, the spacecraft existed in a
power negative state transitioning between the offnominal spacecraft modes.

There were three main factors that allowed the spacecraft
to become power positive enough to allow tumble
recovery:

Spacecraft power systems should survive a tumble
The EPS subsystem on VPM was sized to be
significantly larger than required by the nominal
operational power environment (driven by payload
operations and attitude state) to account for a tumbling
scenario. VPM was constrained to a 'flower petal' solar
panel configuration (Figure 2) because of the many
antennas and externally mounted sensors, so there were
many tumble scenarios that VPM could be power
negative (i.e. the entire “back” hemisphere of the
spacecraft’s field of view).

1.

Changing the default boot mode to survival
allowing for longer up-time

2.

Seasonally increasing illumination period

3.

A very-slowly precessing tumble

When the spacecraft was booted back up after the
phoenix mode charge period had completed, it would
nominally set the spacecraft to sun safe mode and remain
there for at least one hour – this was to allow the ADCS
time to attempt to continue its detumble mode. This
meant that the spacecraft spent an hour of its operable
time futilely trying to de-tumble the spacecraft which
depleted the batteries much quicker than anticipated.
Thus, the first command that was sent was to update the
default boot mode to survival mode; this change gave the
VPM team much higher likelihood of having a line of
site pass where the spacecraft was in an operable mode.
The other large factor in survival mode turning into a
power positive mode was an increasing illumination
period; when VPM deployed it had the shortest time in
sun for the orbit. For the first 10 days of operations, VPM
rebooted 53 times, but the time spent in phoenix mode
was slowly reducing. On the tenth day, the operators
were able to upload and execute a command sequence to
test a fix in the ADCS subsystem. Less than 5% of total
system momentum was dissipated by the magnetic
torque rods in this test of approximately 1 hour. From
then on, the satellite was power positive in its tumbling
survival mode. This even slightly reduced tumble rate
likely enabled the EPS maximum power point tracker

Willett Gies
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algorithm to track power more effectively and the
vehicle was recovered.

used the STX2 modem, but VPM used the newer STX3
modem. The new modem only has an effective radiated
power of 96mW which is approximately 1.6 dB less than
the STX2 modem 3.

Telemetry should be able to be received in a tumble
without fine knowledge of spacecraft position

GEARRS 2 demonstrated a beacon efficiency of around
75% efficiency in a tumble of approximately 6 degrees /
sec from an elliptical orbit of 350 km x 700 km at 55
degrees inclination [3]. VPM is demonstrating a beacon
efficiency of around 30% in a controlled spin of 0.4 - 0.8
degrees /sec in a 460 km, circular orbit at 52 degrees
inclination.

The Globalstar beaconing feature on VPM (Figure 3)
was designed based on experience from the GEARRS
and SHARC satellites; both of those satellites showed a
relatively high efficiency of beacon receipt in a tumble.
The VPM design did not account for the change in
Globalstar modem though; GEARRS and SHARC both

Figure 3: Received “complete” beacons for VPM, demonstrating global reception.
The beacon efficiency was significantly worse in the
high rate tumble – this made predicting when the
spacecraft was in an operable mode very difficult for
operators. In order to better understand the phasing of
spacecraft mode over time, the VPM team obtained a
Globalstar report that outlined when partial beacons
were received (Figure 4).

https://fccid.io/L2V-STX2-1;
STX3
3
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to fence the spacecraft and apply a shift in time to the
TLE being used.
This more accurate ephemeris and continuous
improvements to the ground software removed variables,
allowed confidence to build, and gave the team the
chance to send one crucial command, then another, and
another until the system stabilized. Note that originally
the plan was for the Globalstar beacon to transmit the
spacecraft’s GPS position once the system had
detumbled. This nominally would have allowed the team
to quickly and accurately point ground antennas without
requiring early, ambiguous TLE use. With the
intermittent GPS signal and the shift to booting to
survival mode, where GPS was unpowered, this was not
generally possible.

Figure 4: Beacon reception for partial beacons (<
36B) and full beacons. Reception rate for this period
was 24%.

Tumble root cause and on orbit repair
When attempting to identify the root cause of the tumble,
the VPM team had very little access to telemetry;
furthermore, once the cause was identified, the team had
to work around having spotty commanding to the
spacecraft. As the TT&C link became more reliable (e.g.
the orbital position was understood and power
generation marginally improved), the team was able to
debug the attitude anomaly: an incorrectly reporting
magnetometer. During final vehicle assembly, the
externally mounted sun sensor/magnetometer was short
circuited due to the package being installed upside down.
When this error was found during AI&T, the team did its
due diligence to ensure the sun sensor was not damaged
(it was still functional), but was unaware that the package
also included a magnetometer. The team documented the
failure and proceeded with assembly. Given the damaged
magnetometer was required by the autonomous
detumble algorithm, action needed to be taken on orbit
to recover the spacecraft from the tumble. The damaged
sensor had caused the system to induce a tumble of
approximately 15 deg/sec in two axes, and an estimated
40 deg/sec in the third. Through discussion with the
ADCS provider, a path forward was identified. The
ADCS had the option to change the magnetometer used
by its algorithms, so if the secondary magnetometer was
still functional, then VPM could detumble. The solution
was relatively simple given the flexibility of the flight
software and ADCS system, but made difficult by the
spacecraft state of health. All Radiant hardware
applications included a raw pass-through command to
send any new commands that might become necessary
on-orbit. A command sequence was uploaded to the
spacecraft that would execute a series of raw ADCS
commands. The team opted to create two command
sequences: the first would be used to verify the
secondary magnetometer’s functionality, and the second
would permanently set the secondary magnetometer as
the default. These command sequences were quickly

This report confirmed that VPM was alive but tumbling
too fast to get all four required packets of a beacon
reliably, but could still get individual messages through
the Globalstar constellation. In the tumble following
deployment, VPM was having less than 5% success on
complete beacons, but approximately 20% success on
receiving a partial beacon before the phoenix mode cycle
started. Both the partial and complete beacons proved to
be valuable despite the significantly reduced rate at
which they were received. Partial beacons could not be
interpreted, but the mere presence of a partial beacon
helped to determine the power state of the spacecraft,
especially when paired with complete beacons. In
addition, complete beacons verified that the solar panels
were fully deployed, subsystem power draws were
nominal, temperatures were nominal, and surprisingly,
spacecraft position, velocity, and time were occasionally
received.
Radio links should be able to close in a tumble
There was significant, tested, margin on the telemetry,
tracking, and command (TT&C) link budget, and the
spacecraft could close link in the fast tumble. There were
many compounding issues working against the team
while tumbling on Day 1. CubeSats often deploy in large
clusters and VPM was no different with 18 new objects
in its deployment group. This required significant
conversation with the antenna operator throughout
LEOPS to identify the object and track the uncertain
two-line elements (TLEs) generated in the first days and
weeks. Coupled with the uncertainty of spacecraft power
and the potential for seeing one of the known radio bugs,
anxiety was high that communications would work,
despite confidence in the link budget. After several days,
beacons where received with valid GPS position,
velocity, and time, and the VPM team worked closely
with the ground station engineers and antenna operators
Willett Gies
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implemented and tested against simulated hardware as
VPM did not have a flatsat against which to verify the
commands. Once the command sequences were ready
for upload, the VPM team was able to upload the
command
sequences,
verify
the
secondary
magnetometer functionality (Figure 5), and begin the
detumble process in just three days.

be required to fully detumble and begin sun pointing, but
the spacecraft was able to accomplish this with no
phoenix mode reboots (Figure 6).

Figure 6: VPM battery voltage/state of charge as
detumble occurred. Phoenix mode would occur at
6.5V on the batteries.
That was surprising as it took 16 hours for the satellite to
fully detumble (Figure 7), which was significantly
longer than the expected duration of a spacecraft survival
mode power state. This was likely due to a combination
of an increasing illumination period and naturally
varying tumble state. The VPM team’s design choices,
planning for anomalies, allowed the spacecraft to be
recovered from this potentially mission ending event. In
the end, the system was one integration error away from
achieving an aggressive, automated on-orbit
commissioning sequence.

Figure 5: Broken magnetometer (first 7 seconds) and
undamaged magnetometer. The magnetometer
measuring the field “B” was notibly below expected
values for VPM’s location in orbit, indicating
damage. The undamaged magnetometer shows
magnitude near expectations. (Magnetic field vector
components and magnitudes shown in the plot.)
Given the power negative state of the spacecraft, it was
expected that multiple power cycles of the system would

Figure 7: Measured body rates as detumble occurred over 16 hours. Note z-axis is initially saturated. Full
three axis control recovered under 2 deg/s tumble rates, right at the end of the timeframe.
Willett Gies
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OUTCOMES AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
elements (e.g. mission success criteria and key
behaviors) but omitted testing the vehicle’s
operation when it was simply standing by. The
behavior between events was not well known
until the vehicle was left to its own devices in
orbit. Why should it be expected that a vehicle
that has never been left on its own to work
properly in orbit on its own? In the future, SSP
will likely consider things like total up-time
vs. max single duration on vs. time spent
operating between human input. Focusing on
understanding behaviors, not just debugging
functionality, is important.

Outcomes
VPM has been very useful to SSP for providing some
demonstration and validation of designs as well as
practices. Having a team enabled to make corrections
and iterations quickly is pivotal. Further, having handson hardware as early as possible enables interface
debugging and time with higher and higher levels of
integration provides confidence in system behaviors.
Finally, doing these things and accepting that operations,
especially commissioning, is partially an extension of
test activities where system behaviors are being
discovered and potentially debugged, has led to
continual improvements in how the VPM mission is
accomplished.
One key example of this mentality continuing through
operations is the fact that the team, due to COVID-19
impacts, shifted operations from an on-base operations
center to the capability to securely operate the spacecraft
from their homes. The majority of the data chain had
been deployed into cloud infrastructure and with several
quick alterations, and assessment/confirmation of
complying with security needs, the VPM team has made
it such that the spacecraft can be flown from anywhere
there is an internet connection. This is the first time an
Air Force owned and operated spacecraft has used
commercial ground service providers, cloud-based
operations, and remotely operated a spacecraft.
Given the demonstration from this mission, and the
versatility it has provided in adverse conditions (a
pandemic), future missions are likely to be operated this
way, as security postures allow.

•

There is never enough COMM testing: SSP
aims to test all of its systems with an end-toend (ground and space segment) over the air,
long range communications test. This verifies
the link budget and demonstrates that the radio
configurations are correct. Similar to the
previous bullet, the flight radio behavior was
never tested for longer duration, nontransmitting, operations. VPM also had a
condensed version of this test (not over the air,
and compatibility testing for ground system).
Because this system is effectively the most
important to do anything else with the
spacecraft, it should receive commensurate
attention and time.

•

Modular design with expectation that
interfaces are immature: Expecting that
interface maturation will occur during the
system integration process (hopefully on a
flatsat instead of the flight unit(s)). Enabling
the team to quickly add to, or modify, the
interfaces to bring the system together
accelerates the overall integration process to
meet design intent.

•

Flight software/ground software
configurability is fundamental to agility:
Making sure that the mission team has access
to, and can configure as needed, the software
systems allow flexibility to uncertainty and the
ability to achieve objectives as capability
comes on-line. When integrating “black-box”
subsystems into an integrated system, modular
software allows changes to occur, minimizing
schedule impacts compared to fixing the
black-box. Further, a configurable system
allows flexibility to put off lower priority
objectives to later, producing an agile
experimentation platform.

However, there are always numerous elements of the
program and SSP’s approach that could have been better.
Some of the most important take-aways from SSP’s
approach are as follows:
•

Survive a Tumble: Designing spacecraft to
operate through a tumble, as was the design
guidance for SSP missions [6], is not only too
driving to the design but it is often not done
with vendor supplied spacecraft buses.
Designing to survive a tumble, with a welltested phoenix mode (that can use the charge
circuitry to charge batteries even if the vehicle
is off), has proven incredibly important for
VPM. This is likely to become a standard
feature.

•

Test the “in-between” times: Day in the life
testing was, correctly, focused on specific

Willett Gies

9

34th Annual
Small Satellite Conference

Beyond the formulated take-aways, there are multiple
on-going issues and performance studies that the team
continues to assess. The planned non-volatile storage, an
industrial grade SD card, failed several weeks into
operations and telemetry was remapped to RAM. The
radio also has demonstrated challenging, intermittent
behavior that has been partially corrected through fault
protection improvements within the flight software; root
cause or more permanent corrections other than "reset"
are still being assessed. Finally, SSP is considering how
to better end-to-end verify the critical elements involved
in the detumble process which would improve
confidence in achieving higher level functionality more
quickly in the mission. Sensor/actuator functionality and
performance testing may be a reasonable step or even
full Helmholtz cage verification; complexity and
accuracy of ground based testing for these activities are
in debate.

basis (instead of a per pass basis). Automatic telemetry
downlinks are managed by the flight system based on the
spacecraft mode and are easily configurable. Automatic
downlinks prioritize telemetry generated when the link
is active and fill the remaining bandwidth with stored
telemetry; this allows automation to perform verification
steps quickly while downlinking stored state of health
telemetry. The command management of the flight
software allows for individual commands or command
sequences to be added or removed from the schedule; all
the telemetry required to identify individual commands
is able to be requested. The ground system is currently
using these features to automatically synchronize ground
schedules to the spacecraft by adding or removing
individual commands from the schedule. Each command
in the ground schedule is given a time-to-live where the
synchronization automation will attempt to add it to the
satellite command queue and ensure the command stays
in the queue until it has been executed. These features
have helped reduce VPM operations staffing from
around 17 FTE in the initial month of operations, to less
than one FTE since that time, even while the vehicle was
still being commissioned. Further automation features
are actively being developed and can be quickly
implemented and iterated on due to the abstract, modular
frameworks of both the flight and ground systems.

Future Outlook
A continual thread of development in the Small Satellite
Portfolio
is
the
concept
of
path-agnostic
communications. At the mission level, SSP is not relying
on a single path, network or radio to deliver mission data
to the user. By exploring commercial and government
ground
networks
and
satellite
to
satellite
communications, overall geographic and temporal
vulnerability can be reduced. VPM contributed to this
Portfolio vision by incorporating the evaluation of
commercial satellite ground networks as a mission
objective. This process presented unique challenges and
opportunities as a US Air Force owned and operated
mission but has been extremely successful to date.
VPM's demonstration has opened the possibility for
commercial ground to play an integral role in the larger
TT&C architecture of the Small Satellite Portfolio. The
commercial ground networks are tied to a cloud-based
operations system designed and built in tandem with the
VPM mission. A significant systems engineering
endeavor in its own right, this cloud-based operations
suite allowed near instantaneous reaction to the COVID19 crisis, allowing secure, remote access to the
operations center from off-site locations. A fully remote,
virtualized operations center, while not an initial
requirement to meet the DSX augmentation mission, has
been an example of reactive, agile development with
lasting value.
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